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SECURITIES LAW SYMPOSIUM
THE MODERNIZATION OF FINANCIAL
SERVICES LEGISLATION
INTRODUCTION
LAURENCE H. MEYER *
It is a pleasure to be back, both at the university and in the city in which I
spent so many enjoyable and interesting years. To be sure, I have noticed
recently the quaint habit of the locals to talk about real topics, and it is, I must
say, refreshing to hear non-Washington conversation. I must also tell you that
I have learned to speak governmentese and, what’s more, I am enjoying both
the language and the challenges that being a member of the Federal Reserve
Board brings.
Today, I would like to talk to you about something that has devoured
much of my time at the Fed and has also taught me to listen more closely to
the nuances of government-speak—financial modernization. The issues are
real and affect all of us in our daily lives.
Financial modernization is the term used to cover legislation that would
permit financial firms—banks, securities dealers, thrifts, and insurance
companies—to get into each other’s business. Some variants would authorize
commercial firms and banking to combine as well. “Modernizing” requires
the unwinding of legislation adopted in the 1930s to address real and
* Member, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. Ph.D. 1970, Massachusetts
Institute of Technology; B.A. 1965, Yale University.
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imagined conflicts that were thought to have contributed to the Great
Depression, or at least to have made it worse.
At the outset, we ought to understand what it is that is driving this effort.
For so long, it seems, we lived in a world in which we had our checking
account at a bank, our mortgage at the S&L, bought our insurance from an
independent agent and our stocks from a broker. If we were lucky enough to
have a little extra, we bought other assets and investments from other
specialists, and hardly ever thought of breaking out of the traditional mold.
But technology and globalization have irreversibly changed what had
become the post-war norm. High-speed computers and constant pressure to
press the envelope of regulatory limits made possible everything from money
market mutual funds to derivatives; from loans once held permanently by a
bank to securitization into a capital market instrument; from computer
shopping for a mortgage to a higher yielding deposit at a virtual bank; from
equity mutual funds from a bank or a broker to a checking account at your
credit union; from a company that will lend you a mortgage to one that will
do that and sell you a casket (yes, a casket manufacturer owns an S&L); and
I could go on. And let’s not forget all of the firms from abroad that want to
lend you money or sell you assets, just as our financial institutions operate
around the world doing the same. Financial markets are so interconnected
now that developments in Tokyo related to the yen, or Moscow and the
ruble, or Rio de Janeiro and the real are going to affect how much you pay to
get a mortgage loan in St. Louis.
The framework that was essentially constructed in the 1930s seems—and
is—incompatible with the world I’ve just described. It is a world to which we
cannot return. The financial services industry is moving in the direction of
expanded activities and increased competition, driven by market realities,
financial innovations, technological change, and global competition. Federal
banking regulators have been trying to adjust by changing rules and using
loopholes, but the existing statutes limit their options and make it clear that
clean and full rationalization of the structure of the U.S. financial system will
require congressional action. Indeed, financial modernization is an attempt to
recognize the new realities by changing the old laws. While, in the process,
consumers will, it seems clear, be made better off, some institutions will be
made worse off by new competition, and existing participants will be
jockeying for a more favorable position. Unfortunately, that includes
regulators, each of which now has a piece of the regulatory pie, and, if I may
mix my metaphors, each of which is interested in protecting its turf and
prerogatives.
Such issues are, however, no different from any other major economic
legislation that Congress faces every day, and for which it makes choices.
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Indeed, there is substantial agreement now—something that has not existed
until recently—that the time has come and action must be taken. But there
are some fundamental differences of approach that must be evaluated as we
consider financial modernization, and that’s what the rest of my remarks will
address.
Consider for a moment that, in our market economy, businesses can by
and large sell what they want, where they want. Why is it different for banks?
Well, we have learned the hard way that these businesses can have a
significant effect on our economy—its stability and its growth—and the
wealth of the individuals that deal with them. As a result, not only have we
regulated financial institutions quite a bit, we have also—in order to protect
individuals and reduce the aggregate fluctuations of the economy—conveyed
certain benefits on them, especially on the banks. We insure, or guarantee,
some of their claims; we provide banks access to liquidity when they need it,
through the discount window where they can borrow when in temporary
difficulties; we provide banks access to a payments system that can transfer
funds rapidly, allowing their customers instant liquidity; and we supervise
them so that bank customers can feel more confident about dealing with
them. Collectively, we call all of these benefits the “safety net.” Collectively
they permit banks to obtain funds more cheaply than would otherwise be the
case. Or put differently, an important by-product of our decisions to stabilize
banks and to protect those that deal with them is that the banks receive a
subsidy from the government—in this case a lower cost of funding. That fact,
an unintended by-product of other economic policies, has become critical to
the argument between two competing camps on how best to accomplish
financial modernization.
Why is that? Well, let’s consider the more obvious impacts of the safety
net per se and of its implicit subsidy.
First, the safety net, by lowering the cost of bank funding, provides a bank
with a competitive advantage over other financial institutions. The banking
system ends up larger than it otherwise would be and the rivals of banks find
banks a little stiffer competitors than they otherwise might be. It is true that,
as economists would argue, the value of the subsidy gets spread or dispersed
by competition (1) to depositors, (2) to borrowers, and (3) to initial
shareholders who capture the capitalized value of the subsidy. But, none of
these change the fact that the subsidy makes banks stronger competitors; it
“unlevels the playing field,” in governmentese. And, as I will discuss more
fully in a moment, it is for this reason that policymakers should be interested
in, if not trying to eliminate subsidies, at least constraining their spread.
The safety net has another significant unintended effect, beyond the
subsidy and its interinstitutional competitive implications: it weakens—in
some cases eliminates—the incentive for creditors of banks to be concerned
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about the strength of the bank. Why should a depositor of less than $100,000
care if the bank is creditworthy, if it will live up to its obligations? After all,
the government will promptly pay off the deposit if the bank does not. Even
uninsured creditors are less careful than they might be for other businesses to
whom they have lent money—for that is what a deposit is, a loan to a bank—
because they know the bank is supervised and has access to liquidity through
the Fed. All of this means that there is less market discipline restricting the
behavior of banks. Bank management thus presents what economists call,
and members of Congress have adopted in their own vocabulary, a “moral
hazard.” This is shorthand for the fact that bank management, being less
subject to the kind of realities that others who borrow money must face, are
more free to take on risk than they otherwise would be: their risk taking, at
least over some pretty wide range, does not much affect the rate they have to
pay to borrow money from the public. One of the implications that flow from
moral hazard, therefore, is that the incentive structure is distorted: profits
belong to the private sector, but a significant part of the potential losses are
socialized. Put differently, there is a disconnect between the rewards from,
and the costs of, taking risk.
As a result, there is a fourth impact of the safety net—beyond subsidy and
competitive and risk incentive distortions—the taxpayers, that bear the cost
of the potential risk, must protect themselves through the supervision and
regulation of the issuer of the guaranteed deposit. No doubt we supervise and
regulate banks and other financial institutions because we have learned that
their failures can have disproportionately large impacts on the macro real
economy. But, in addition, we supervise as a substitute for a missing or
weakened form of supervision that other borrowers have—the market
discipline that creditors bring to bear in their own self interest. Banks, with
less market discipline, are thus supervised and regulated by government
agencies in large part in order to monitor and perhaps limit the extra risk that
banks can take because they have the protection of the safety net.
Supervision and regulation are not per se good things. They represent
interference—there is no other word—with the market process, and as such,
this stifles innovation and some desirable risk taking. We should not want to
see this supervision and regulation spread because it interferes with markets
and choices, and if the safety net is extended, we will extend, by necessity,
supervision and regulation. In governmentese, when businesses succeed in
tapping the honey pot, as sure as God made little green apples, the regulator
will have to be there to protect the taxpayer.
I hope by now it is clear that the safety net creates a whole category of
problems for financial modernization. The recipient institutions, banks, have
a competitive advantage through the subsidy implicit in the safety net; their
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risk incentives are distorted, if not corroded, by the safety net; and
inefficiencies and burdens are placed on them through supervision and
regulation to protect the public from both the effects and costs of excess risk
taking that the safety net creates. It is, I submit, critical that we do not, at least
unintentionally, in the process of financial modernization extend the safety
net more broadly than exists today. To do so, I believe would expose our
system to greater risk and more regulation—both steps that could well kill
the goose that lays the golden egg.
How, you might well ask, can we avoid this effect if financial
modernization is defined as letting financial institutions into each other’s
business? For, if an insurance company buys a bank or a bank buys a
securities firm, is not lower cost—subsidized funds from the bank—going to
get spread around? Well, yes and no and it depends.
Now that I’ve clarified that, let me explain just a bit further, or at least
look at the options and the trade-offs.
There are three ways you can absolutely assure that the safety net does
not get spread any wider. The first is to eliminate the safety net—just do
away with deposit insurance, the discount window, Fedwire, and bank
supervision. The second is to do away with the need to have the safety net by
doing away with banks as we know them: create replacements called narrow
banks, banks that, by law, hold only very safe assets making all but a
rudimentary safety net redundant. The third is just to leave banks out of
financial modernization: prohibit other financial institutions from acquiring a
bank and prohibit banks from acquiring other financial institutions. By even
raising these options I am showing my background and my limited term in
the city by the Potomac because none of these are, in my judgement and the
judgement of the political pros, acceptable to the body politic. They have not
been, are not, and will not be on the political agenda.
Nor, as an economist and a public policymaker, am I sure that any of
these options are good public policy. Narrow banking raises in my mind
some very complicated issues of risk shifting that may simply cause the same
problems that created our original macro stability need for the safety net to
show up elsewhere. It might be nice to roll back the size of deposit insurance,
if we could. It would certainly be nice to underline to uninsured depositors
the risks that they take by forcing more disclosures of banks’ risk positions
and requiring the authorities to act at the time of failures in ways that cause
these depositors to bear the cost of their miscalculation or bad luck. But, I
think deposit insurance and the whole of the safety net have stood us in good
stead in the macro stability area and it would be a mistake to dismantle them.
Rather, it might be best to revise our supervisory and regulatory policies in
ways that simulate market discipline without the side effects that we wish to
avoid. This is a road we’ve already begun to tread. If we excluded banks
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from financial modernization in order to avoid safety net and subsidy
transference over a wider area, banks would simply take a smaller share of
the total financial markets pie as their less protected and subsidized
competitors expanded. I doubt that banks would wither away, but they would
surely become less important. Other institutions would become more
important lenders and more important borrowers—that is, creators of assets
for the public to hold. Should we care? After all, what is important is not the
return to bank stockholders or the salaries of bank managers. What are
important is that borrowers and lenders get served cheaply and efficiently
and that the financial system contributes to economic growth and stability. If
banks are less important and other institutions are more important, so what?
My conclusion is that we should not try to leave banks out of financial
modernization. As I noted earlier, such an approach is a political nonstarter
that may just hold up the whole modernization process. I’ve also decided that
it’s inequitable and inefficient. Such a decision is a unilateral action to reduce
the capital value of banking, and it would require a painful and costly exodus
of financial capital and human expertise to other financial institutions.
Perhaps most important, there is an institutional vehicle that is available that
would permit banking organizations to participate in financial modernization
with a minimal risk of transference of the safety net subsidy: the bank
holding company.
As this audience well knows, a bank holding company is a corporation
that owns a bank and other authorized financial businesses. To be sure, some
of the safety net subsidy leaks out of the bank to its holding company
affiliates: a bank holding company has cheaper financing simply because its
major subsidiary is an insured bank. In addition, a bank pays dividends,
earned in part with the subsidy, to the holding company parent that can be
used to finance the other affiliates and a bank can lend to its affiliates. But all
this leakage appears to be rather limited, with most of the subsidy contained
at the bank. Dividend payments from the bank are limited by the bank’s need
to maintain capital by regulation and supervision, and statute caps the lending
by banks to their affiliates. In the future, banks will become a smaller part of
the holding company if and as financial modernization permits them to enter
other businesses. Thus, I have concluded that the holding company vehicle
seems to be a perfectly reasonable way to limit the safety net transference.
One may well say that, as a member of the Federal Reserve Board and as
one that has admitted liking his job there, this conclusion is not unbiased. The
Federal Reserve, after all, supervises all bank holding companies (and state
member banks, which account for only about a quarter of aggregate bank
assets). Thus, I can be accused of adopting a position that protects the Fed’s
turf. More about that in a minute, but first let’s take a look at the other
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol77/iss2/1
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structural model for bank participation in financial modernization,
championed by the U.S. Treasury.
The Treasury has been the proponent of the “option” of using either the
bank holding company or the bank subsidiary as the vehicle for new
permissible activities. A bank could choose either for the location of its
securities firm or insurance company affiliate. Such a choice reminds me of
the story about the sports writer Haywood Hale Broun who was authorized
by his editor to hire an assistant for $35 or $40 a week, and promptly gave
the most promising applicant the choice between these two sums. A
subsidiary is clearly the most attractive for the bank because it is the best
vehicle for transferring the safety net subsidy: the capital invested in the
subsidiary is totally funded by the bank and thus benefits dollar for dollar
from the bank subsidy. The subsidiary option would thus be the choice de
jure of intelligent bank management, causing all of the things that one should
worry about. It would give the sub a funding cost competitive advantage vis-
a-vis independent rivals and even bank holding company affiliates. It would,
in addition, distort incentives for risk taking because of that direct lower cost
of capital, as well as because creditors of the sub would presume parent bank
assistance in times of stress, since losses at the sub fall directly on the parent
bank’s capital. As long as there is a safety net, the bank subsidiary approach
to financial modernization is a truly bad idea and the Federal Reserve Board
strongly opposes it on the merits.
Beyond the safety net, the operating subsidiary creates significant
potential conflicts among supervisors. One of the criteria for competitive
equity and equal treatment among institutions is to assume, in so far as
possible, equal supervisory and regulatory treatment regardless of structure
or ownership—what in governmentese is called functional regulation.
Reflective, I believe, of the close, intimate relationship between a bank and
its subsidiary, the departments of the Treasury that regulate national banks,
the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, as well as the Office of Thrift
Supervision, have already indicated their opposition to relying on and
deferring to regulation of securities subs of their depository institutions by
the SEC and insurance subs of these entities by the state insurance regulators.
Even if these problems were addressed, it seems entirely possible that, since
losses of subsidiaries are borne by their bank parent, difficulties at subs sow
the seeds of conflict between the functional regulator of the sub and the
regulator of the bank. Difficult issues would arise about which entity should
be assisted in times of stress, as well as about the effect of any action by one
regulator on the entity supervised by another. The parent of a subsidiary of a
holding company is not an entity that is protected by the safety net, and the
risk of these conflicts is minimized.
My colleagues and I are also concerned about the implications of the bank
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subsidiary form on the safety and soundness of banks. It is not, let me hasten
to add, that we think most of the proposed new financial activities are
unusually risky. They are not. Rather, as I have noted, whatever the risk, it is
a fact that any loss suffered by the new subsidiary must fall on the bank’s
capital and weaken the bank. In contrast, losses at a subsidiary of the holding
company fall on the holding company’s capital, not the bank’s. The Treasury
likes to underline how the profits of a bank sub strengthen the bank because
subsidiary profits increase the bank’s capital, and their accounting and
arithmetic on this are impeccable. However, if there is to be a real benefit one
has to assume that more can be earned on the bank’s investment in the sub
than it can earn in banking. It is an iron law of financial economics that the
higher the return the higher the risk, and the higher the risk the higher the
chance of loss—and that is, in fact, our concern.
The Treasury believes our concerns are unfounded because they would
cap the investment in the sub to the amount of the excess regulatory capital
of the bank and deduct that investment from the bank’s regulatory capital.
Poof, it’s gone! And any bank sub losses would thus do nothing to the bank’s
capital because first, the deduction has already occurred and second, at the
split second when sub losses equal the initial investment, the sub by rule
would be declared bankrupt and any losses above that amount would be
reversed when the bankruptcy is closed out. I’m not sure what the lawyers in
the audience may think of that, but economists and market types have some
real doubts. Excess regulatory capital is a regulator’s construct. The market
looks at that capital as real, as does the bank management that is holding the
capital the market demands of it. Indeed, under GAAP there will be no
deduction and bank creditors—like uninsured depositors—will look to that
capital for protection. And, I’m sure this audience will agree, the creditors of
the failed sub will meet the bank in court, trying to require private bank
assumption of subsidiary debt and the reversal of any losses in excess of the
original investment—which can happen in minutes intraday in today’s
financial markets—can well take months or years to resolve.
Full analysis requires that we step back from these increasingly technical
arguments. All sides, I think, agree that we need financial reform. Both sides
agree that the safety net is a problem. The disagreement is about structure
and the disagreement is strongly and deeply felt. The issue of turf has been
raised. The Fed supports bank holding companies as the structure, and it
supervises and regulates bank holding companies. The Treasury supports the
operating subsidiary of the bank—the op sub—option, and through a
department of the Treasury, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, it
supervises national banks, the class of banks most likely to take advantage of
new permissible activities. What are the respective turf arguments?
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The Treasury argues that in a republic the elected administration should
have a significant, important voice in economic policy, including banking.
This argument, by the way, is not limited to the current Administration; it has
been voiced by several recent Administrations from both parties. But that
position requires that the Administration’s policy entry be through the
national banking system, which it supervises. Indeed, in the current
discussions the Treasury asserts that without its version of modernization, the
national banks will decline—a curious observation since national banks’
market share has risen notably with interstate banking.
I, for one, believe that the Treasury’s posture on the need to be a
significant policymaker in banking has merit. We should look for ways to
assure that they play a significant role in banking and financial markets. But,
I, for one, also think it would be a terrible mistake to do so in a way that
spreads the distortions and costs of the safety net and increases the risks to
the banking system.
Finally, I feel compelled to explain the need for the Federal Reserve to
continue to be a significant participant in bank supervision. This role is
exercised through two relationships. First, the Fed is the primary bank
regulator for state member banks. I noted earlier that state member banks
represent only one-fourth of total banking assets. More important, perhaps, in
relation to the Fed’s systemic risk responsibilities, the Fed is the primary
regulator of only seven of the largest twenty-five banking organizations.
Therefore, the primary window through which the Fed maintains contact
with, and oversight of, the largest and most complex banking organizations is
as supervisor of bank holding companies. The latter role, I might add, would
decline significantly if the op sub, the banking subsidiary, approach were
adopted. The economics of the safety net subsidy simply would induce a
massive shift from bank holding companies to bank subsidiaries, leaving the
holding company an unneeded husk in relatively short order. Why should we
care? Or why should anyone not an employee of the Fed care?
The Federal Reserve, in its role as the central bank of the United States, is
the institution that is charged not only with monetary policy and contributing
to macro economic stability, but also to avoiding and managing financial
crises. I believe that responsibility requires that we have the authority to act
and that our staff maintain the expertise about how the system really works
that simply cannot be obtained from reading reports from another agency or
even textbooks from scholars at Washington University. That expertise, I
believe, comes only from hands on knowledge of banking and financial
institutions and markets that can come only from supervision. If our
supervisory responsibility begins to atrophy, so will our skills. A central bank
with ivory tower knowledge will not be able to deal adequately with financial
crises.
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